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opment bonds and utilities bonds. While controlling for the size of the education 
sector, I ﬁ  nd campaign contributions from educational interests are associated 
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ated with lower utilities borrowing. Unions do not have an independent effect on 
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In 1986, the federal government placed a cap on the volume of tax-exempt municipal bonds that
states can issue each year if the proceeds are used by private entities. The cap, in year 2000
dollars per capita, has ranged from just under $50 to over $400 depending primarily on a state's
population. In most states and years, the cap appears to be binding, so state governments are
allocating a scarce resource. This study looks into the political economy of the allocation of the
volume cap authority within states. I estimate that an additional dollar per capita of private-
activity volume cap authority results in an additional $0.80 per capita of private-activity municipal
bond borrowing. The regulation has a strong impact on private-activity borrowing for mortgage
revenue bonds and student loans. The prominence of the manufacturing and utilities sectors in
the state in°uences the authorizations for industrial development and utilities bonds. Explicit
political activity does not seem to greatly in°uence the process. Union members do not appear to
draw authorization to their industries. Among the competing industries, only in the case of higher
education is there some evidence that campaign contributions positively a®ect allocation decisions.
The political economy of the private activity volume cap distribution is interesting because it
sheds light on an unusual type of resource allocation. The program gives elected o±cials, and their
appointees, the ability to allocate a valuable, scarce resource without taxing their constituents or
authorizing any funds from their state or local budgets. The limitations of the program result
in a diverse but fairly well de¯ned set of interests (manufacturers, utilities, mortgage lenders,
commercial residential developers, post-secondary education) competing for the authorization. In
an exploration of the data, we ¯nd insights into both the relative strength of the interests and the
channels of their in°uence.
In light of the recent (2008-2009) near collapse of credit markets, the next few years will witness
massive changes in the scope and nature of government relationships to these markets. In particular,
3government participation in private credit markets will be re-evaluated. There is much discussion of
the perverse incentives created by securitization of mortgage and consumer debt, and interest rates
that re°ected risk transferred to the taxpayer. The topic covered in this article is relevant because
it represents a parallel to the systems that may have failed. Rather than securitizing mortgages
and student loans after they have been written, municipal governments issue bonds and relend the
proceeds to private entities.
2 Background
The institutions of ¯scal federalism have developed in the United States such that the federal
government does not tax local government activities, and vice versa. States and municipalities
can issue an unlimited amount of municipal debt for public purposes, and all interest paid to the
investors is exempt from federal income tax. Municipalities enjoy a lower cost of borrowing than
corporations, non-pro¯ts, or individuals in part because the tax exemption means investors will
4accept a lower interest rate.1 Municipalities also pay a relatively low interest rate because their
default risk is low. They have a low default risk because they have the ability to raise revenue by
force through taxation, they often have a more diversi¯ed economic base than most corporations,
and they are more likely to be bailed out by a higher level of government if they approach default.
In fact, the municipal default rate over the period 1980 to 2006 was just 0.78%. This is far better
than the default rate for similarly rated corporate bonds, which averaged 9.69% from 1970 to 2006
(Ou 2008).
In addition to funding public buildings, schools, and roads, municipal bonds are issued for
purposes that are usually funded privately, but that have some public bene¯t. The largest use is
mortgage revenue bonds, which are believed to have bene¯ts to the public generally by increasing
investment in residential communities. Student loans, another major use, are justi¯ed in the same
way public schooling and state university subsidies are. Higher education enables people to be
more productive workers and e®ective citizens, thereby improving economic well-being and quality
of life for the residents of the state.
1Let t be the tax rate faced by the investor. The principal (P) can be invested in a corporate (c) bond or other
investment that provides a stream of taxable returns. P is returned when the bond matures in X periods. Alternately,
the principal can be invested in a tax-free municipal (m) bond. With a real interest rate of i, and coupon of r, the
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Knowing this, the borrower can o®er a lower coupon rm, as long as the tax exemption makes the present value of
the municipal bond preferable to corporate bonds paying rc.
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5In the case of municipal borrowing for private activity, the demander of the funds is generally a
pro¯t-maximizing ¯rm, a loss-minimizing nonpro¯t, or a rational individual consumer. If given the
choice between identical amounts of capital, one with a higher borrowing cost and the other with a
lower borrowing cost, borrowers would always choose the latter. Three forces prevent all borrowing
from being done through state and local governments. The ¯rst limitation is market discipline.
While municipalities have a strong ability to repay their debts, it is not limitless. The interest rates
municipalities pay are an increasing function of the total outstanding debt from previous periods.
Market participants monitor the ratio of outstanding debt to the tax base, and investors demand
higher rates from heavily indebted municipalities (Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom 1995).
The second limitation is the complex political process that allocates municipal bond funding.
Firms and consumers cannot simply bid for the supplied units of bond-funded capital. Obtaining the
funds involves working with state agencies or conduit banks, completing a costly application process,
in°uencing legislative activity, and sometimes appealing to voters through ballot measures. These
administrative burdens introduce costs, delays, and risks that may overwhelm the tax advantage
and guarantee.
The third limitation is the federal legislation that limits the volume of tax-exempt ¯nancing of
private activity that can be undertaken by a state or any of its entities in a calendar year. There
was a signi¯cant increase in private-activity borrowing during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In
the mid-1980s, Congress became concerned that state and local governments were de¯ning \public
activity" too broadly when using tax-free municipal bonds to fund projects such as professional
sports stadiums. This meant that large volumes of taxable investment activity were being replaced
with tax-exempt investments and thereby reducing federal income tax receipts. In the 1986 tax
reforms, a de¯nition was established for private-activity borrowing, and a cap was placed on the
total volume permitted in each state. The cap was the greater of $50 per capita or $150 million.
6Any interest paid on private-activity borrowing beyond the cap would be subject to federal income
taxes.
Congress began by de¯ning private-activity bonds to be any bond of which more than 10% of
the proceeds is transferred to a private entity2. Also, if more than 10% of the interest and principal
of the bonds will be repaid by a private entity, the bonds are designated to be private-activity
bonds. Bonds that meet one of the criteria generally meet both. Congress then imposed the cap
on the volume of private-activity bonds that would be issued as tax exempt bonds3. Of course,
there were exceptions. Private-activity bonds are not counted toward the cap if the proceeds are
used for the following purposes: airports, docks and wharfs, mass commuting facilities, 501(c)(3)
non-pro¯t organizations (including most universities and museums), pollution control equipment
for hydroelectric power plants, veterans' mortgages, high-speed intercity rail, and immediately
refunding outstanding bonds (re¯nancing). With these exceptions, the volume cap falls on the
remaining categories: mortgage revenue bonds, multifamily rental housing bonds, student loan
bonds, industrial development bonds (IDBs), private utility infrastructure (often referred to as
exempt facilities), and miscellaneous purposes (farm programs, etc.).
Within these categories, there are further quali¯cations that must be met. I summarize the
main ones here.
Mortgage revenue bond proceeds must be used to purchase owner-occupied homes. Bor-
rowers must be ¯rst-time buyers. The home's price must be below 90% of the area's average. The
borrower's income must be below 115% of the area's median family income. The funds must be
used for new mortgages, not re¯nancing. Funding can be used for rehabilitation, but not more than
$15,000 per borrower.
Industrial development bonds are limited to $10 million per facility. They cannot be used
2Internal Revenue Code, U.S. Code 26, Section 141
3Internal Revenue Code, U.S. Code 26, Section 146
7for retail outlets, entertainment, or recreational facilities.
Multifamily housing bonds must fund projects in which 20% of the residents have incomes
less than 50% of the area median or 40% of the residents have incomes less than 60% of the area
median.
Student loan bonds must be used with federally guaranteed loan programs or equivalent
state programs. Student borrowers must be residents of the state and attend a college or university
in the state.
As ¯gures 1 through 3 illustrate, the language of the legislation created variation in the private-
activity volume cap in several ways. First, states with populations above 3 million people were
bound by the $50 per capita cap while the per capita cap was inversely related to population for
the smaller states (see ¯gure 2). The total volume was still much higher for the larger states (see
¯gure 1). The caps were not indexed for in°ation, so they became progressively more binding in
real terms from 1990 until 2001. Also, as years passed following the 1990 decennial census, the
population estimates grew less accurate, creating a gap between the legal limits and a true $50 per
capita value. Finally, in 2001, the legislation was amended to increase the volume caps and then
index them to in°ation. The time variation, and some cross-sectional variation can be seen in the
trends for the four western states represented in ¯gure 3. The fact that states and certain lobbying
groups requested the increase in the cap suggests the caps were binding.
Another provision of the private-activity bond regulations allows cap authorization to be carried
forward. If the end of the calendar year approaches and a state has not issued private-activity bonds
totaling more than its volume cap, it can ¯le a notice with the IRS, stating it intends to issue bonds
for a speci¯c project within the next three years. Unused cap authority expires if the paperwork
is not ¯led, or the anticipated bonds are not issued within three years. If a carryforward project
falls through, or ¯nds a preferable funding source, the authority that was carried forward cannot
8be re-allocated. This creates a situation in which a state may have had intense competition for
allocation (current and carryforward) during a calendar year, but looking back after three years,
total bonds issued were less than that year's volume cap. Also, the data sets that track bond issues
record the issue date but not the authorization year. In many states, there are years when total
issues exceed the volume cap because some issues are making use of prior-year authority.
Total private-activity-bond volume is substantial but modest relative to other ¯nancial markets.
The largest state-year total issue was in California in 2002, $92 billion.4 That same year, total
outstanding municipal debt was $1,812 billion. Over the years 1992 to 2007, private-activity-bond
volume averaged 6.31% of non¯nancial corporate volume.
2.1 Existing Literature
While the subject matter here intersects with several literatures within public ¯nance, corporate
¯nance, and political institutions, very little has been published on the private-activity volume caps
speci¯cally. Zimmerman, working with the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR), surveyed the mechanisms the states had established to track and allocate the private-
activity authorization (1990). He also collected data on the use of private-activity authority in
1989 and compares it to the borrowing activity before the cap was imposed. Overall, there was a
66% decrease in the 1989 totals relative to the 1984-1986 average. Of the major categories, student
loan borrowing declined the least at 36%, while multifamily housing borrowing declined the most
at 88%. In a paper published the next year, Kenyon improved on the descriptive statistics by
including controls in regression models (1991). She found a large, signi¯cant coe±cient of 0.77,
relating the per capita limit to the per capita borrowing.
Looking only at data from before the volume cap was imposed, Temple sought to explain the
4The next four largest state-year totals were NY 2005: $64 billion, CA 2004: $63 billion, NY 2003: $59 billion,
and CA 2003: $58 billion.
9di®erences in the use of private-activity bonds across states (1993). She theoretically refuted the
notion that private-activity bonds are costless to the issuing municipality if private entities repay
them. In her model, The issuers pay higher interest rates for all future public and private issues.
She does not show that the costs are higher directly, but she reasons that if the costs are higher,
municipalities will substitute away from industrial development bonds toward tax breaks and other
incentives for business attraction. As evidence, she shows a negative elasticity of 0.2 relating
the outstanding bond debt to the use of industrial development bonds in economic development
programs.
One additional set of publications should be noted. These are the IRS's Statistics of Income
Bulletin articles on private-activity bonds. Nutter (1996) and Belmonte (2003, 2005, 2006) provided
descriptive statistics aggregated from the IRS Form 8036-Gs (submitted by all bond-issuing state
and local governments).
Another relevant area of literature is that regarding interest group politics in°uencing public
investment decisions. Much of this work grows out of Olson's theory of collective action (1965).
There is the question of which groups overcome their free-rider problem and organize their e®orts
to in°uence o±cials. If the interest groups are observed as they currently exist, there is the question
of how they behave and how public o±cials respond to them. The existing theories are summarized
in the texts of Grossman and Helpman (2001), Drazen (2000), and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
These texts are theoretical, but there are numerous articles with related empirical tests.
Researchers have addressed the question of whether public o±cials are aiming to maximize
e±ciency or achieve some other political or equity goals. Holtz-Eakin and Rosen proposed a model of
rational, forward-looking capital spending and tested it, using data from New Jersey municipalities
(1989). They found that smaller jurisdictions and suburbs displayed rational behavior from an
economic bene¯t perspective. Larger central cities made investments that appeared more political
10and short-term in nature. In a paper using Japanese data, Yamano and Ohkawara estimated
returns to public infrastructure in economically developed and underdeveloped regions (2000).
They then used simulations to estimate a tradeo® between investing for e±ciency goals versus equity
goals. They concluded that the central government was achieving its stated goal of convergence
between prefectures by shifting investment from the developed to the underdeveloped, but this
was decreasing GDP by approximately 4%. Castells and Sol¶ e-Oll¶ e performed a similar analysis on
Spanish data on transportation infrastructure (2005). Again, political factors weigh more heavily
than economic e±ciency in their results. Finally, Cadot, RÄ oller and Stephan used French data
to test their theoretical model and found that electoral concerns (pork-barrel) drove investment
decisions in France more than economic considerations (2005).
In addition to establishing that political in°uence matters in investment decisions, the political
economy literature has explored the channels of in°uence. Of particular interest is the tradeo®
between votes and campaign contributions. Levitt (1994) estimates that attracting a marginal
vote costs a candidate between $130 and $390, and Stratmann identi¯es a higher cost of votes in
dense urban areas (2004). A recent working paper by Bombardini and Trebbi explicitly modeled
the tradeo® between votes and campaign contributions (2008). They showed that in states where
speci¯c industries have large numbers of employees, those industries give less in campaign contribu-
tions. It is assumed that elected o±cials will act in the best interest of large employers to keep the
votes of the employees, their families, and the communities they support. In some cases, industrial
groups rally voter support for candidates in lieu of cash contributions.
3 Theories of the Allocation Process
The ¯rst question of this analysis is whether the private-activity volume cap in°uences the behavior
of the participants in the borrowing process. If the cap is a potential constraint, we need to know if
11it binds. While it may be natural to assume the private-activity volume cap is a credit constraint,
because it limits the quantity and purpose of tax-exempt borrowing, this is not appropriate. It
is more useful to think of the regulation as a budget constraint. A private-activity borrowing
authorization gives the recipient the right to access credit markets at a lower cost. One could
calculate a subsidy that, if given in the year the borrowing occurs, would make the borrowers
indi®erent between the tax exemption and the subsidy. The state has a budget, set by the cap,
from which it can distribute this de-facto subsidy.
The state o±cials seek to maximize their state's welfare (if they are benevolent), or their
personal welfare, subject to their cap-imposed budget constraint. The volume-cap regulation gives
them an endowment, V , of cap authority to distribute to constituents. If there are no direct costs
borne by anyone in the state for allocating the authority, the state o±cials maximize their utility
by maximizing the authorization of private-activity borrowing.5
Interested constituents face a price for borrowing funds, PA, and an administrative cost of
borrowing through municipal bonds. PA includes the ¯nancing costs as well as the cost of outbidding
rivals to in°uence state o±cial's allocations. The application process can be expensive and time
consuming, in addition to the extra reporting requirements needed to maintain the bonds' tax-
exempt status. Let a designate a ¯xed administrative cost of using municipal funds beyond the
administrative cost of private funds. Treating the borrowed capital as a factor of production, each
third-party borrower must select a quantity to demand.
All cap-subject private-activity borrowing, even that which directs money to individual home-
owners and students, is handled at some point by for-pro¯t ¯rms or loss-minimizing nonpro¯ts. Let
the pro¯t function be represented by ¼i = pyyi¡PlLi¡PAAi¡a, where i indicates the ¯rm, and L
5There could be an indirect economic cost to the state in the form of higher borrowing costs on future municipal
bond issues.
12indicates a numeraire input (think of labor). The ¯rm's production technology is y = f(A;L). Firm
i's demand for A is discontinuous at zero, because the administrative cost applies only with interior
bundles. Alternately, a is a ¯xed cost of producing the interest-subsidized product. Consider N
identical ¯rms within a state, each demanding Ai. The private-activity volume cap is binding if
PN
i=1 Ai > V .
The cap is more likely to be binding if N is high, corresponding to a more developed state
economy, at least in the relevant industries. N will be positively correlated with V , as both are
related to population. Binding is more likely when the price of the output, py, is higher, and
when the quantity sold in the output market, y, is higher. Whether Pl is positively or negatively
correlated with binding depends on the marginal rate of technical substitution between L and A.
Now let us relax the assumption that all ¯rms are in the same industry. Di®erent industries
will have di®erent levels of demand for the funding, corresponding to the di®erent levels of pro¯t
they could realize and the di®erent interest rates they are willing to pay. Let j indicate industry,
and we will begin with two industries. I maintain the assumption that ¯rms are identical within
industries. Let PAj be the price a ¯rm in industry j would pay for the capital without bond funding.
If PA1 > PA2, then ¯rms in industry 1 stand to gain more by shifting to PAm, the bond-funded
cost. The pro¯t functions for the ¯rms become
¼ij = pyjyij ¡ PljLij ¡ PAmAij ¡ a: (5)








For unconstrained states, this remains below V , and A¤ depends only on Aj and Nj. For constrained
states, the story becomes more complicated.
13As speci¯ed in this model, aggregate demand would be a step function with a step down at
(
PN1
i=1 Ai1;PA1) if we arbitrarily label the industry with higher demand as industry 1. If the volume
cap is binding, all ¯rms in industry 1 would get Ai1, and some industry 2 ¯rms would get Ai2. Which
industry 2 ¯rms? If they are identical, the allocation process could be purely random. It could be
purely political if the ¯rms have identical technology and scale, but di®erent political in°uence.
Having discussed the ¯rms, I will turn speci¯cally to the state o±cials now. I am using the terms
state o±cials, public o±cials, and state interchangeably, and treating them individually, or their
aggregates, as rational actors. Following the standard political economy models summarized in
Grossman and Helpman, the public o±cial's utility is the expected return for a speci¯c allocation
of the scarce resource (2001). This is the product of the probability of winning election (or re-
election) and the utility of holding the o±ce. The complementary term, the utility of losing is
assumed to be zero and not written. The probability of election depends on a platform promising
an allocation of A. Ã is a general o±ce rent that the public o±cial receives if elected. The elected
o±cial also receives utility that is a function of A. ° is a constant representing the public o±cial's
baseline likelihood of election, based on party, charisma, or name recognition. H is a vector of the
measures of the voting constituency's size or strength. G is a vector of parameters that represents
how the strength of the constituency translates into the probability of election (perhaps a measure
of political organization or e®ectiveness). I impose a similar structure on the reward function. P is
the industries' potential rents from a dollar of allocation, driven by the interest rate advantage it
provides. W is a vector of parameters that translates the industries' rents into the public o±cial's
rent. Values of W could represent how much the o±cial cares about the constituencies and her
utility from seeing them succeed. If the o±cial is self-interested rather than benevolent, W could
be a schedule of bribes or other transfers such as board seats and post-o±ce employment. If all
values of Wc are the same, then the elected o±cial is interested in pure economic e±ciency, and
14will allocate the borrowing authorization to its highest value use.












Ac · V and Ac · fc(Dc) 8 c (8)
Dc is the relevant gross state product which, through the function fc, speci¯es the maximum
allocation the borrowers in the category would request. From this speci¯cation, it is evident that
the political and economic gains from allocating a dollar to one category are made in the context
of the covariates and parameters in all categories. The model suggests that factors that increase a
constituency's contribution to the o±cial's election or contribution to the o±cial's rents should be
positively associated with allocations to that constituency. The budget constraint, when binding,
dictates that the allocation to category c depends on Gc, Hc, Wc, and Pc as well as these measures
for all the other categories.
In the ¯rst quarter of 2009, I conducted interviews with twelve state administrators.6 I tried
to contact the individuals in each state who were familiar with the private-activity volume cap
allocation process. I asked each of them about how interested constituencies could intervene in the
allocation process, and how elected o±cials responded to voter preferences regarding the allocations.
Most of the respondents expressed the opinion that the process is not highly politicized. The main
reason is that private-activity bonds are seen as having no direct cost to the state's taxpayers
(despite some studies contradicting this). Taxpayers do not pay the principal or interest on the
6The administrators I spoke to include: James W. Parks, CEO, Louisiana Public Facilities Authority; Steve Ki-
towicz, Principal Budget Specialist, O±ce of Policy and Management, State of Connecticut; Steven Green¯eld, COO,
Vermont Economic Development Authority; Gene Eagle, Finance Development Vice President, State of Arkansas;
Mike Martin, Business Finance Program Manager, Wyoming Business Council; Gail Wagner, Manager, Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development's Center for Private Financing; Candace Jones, Chief Legal
Counsel, Department of Development, State of Ohio; Carolyn Seward, Loan O±cer, Ohio Energy O±ce; Steven
Brooks, Executive Director, State Education Assistance Authority, North Carolina.
15bonds, and in most cases, they are not even responsible for the rare defaults. The borrowers are
required to purchase credit enhancement if it is not provided already through another quasi-federal
agency such as Sallie Mae or Fannie Mae.
The administrators perceive a hierarchy of priorities, with industrial development bonds (IDBs)
at the top. IDBs are seen by public o±cials as creating or retaining jobs, which in turn provide tax
revenue and economic demand for every other type of activity. States are eager to assist with any
reasonable IDB request, and rarely receive as many proposals as they plan for. In Ohio, a lottery
system was in place to decide which industrial projects received borrowing authority if requests
exceeded the allocation. However, the lottery was held only twice in two decades because the
requests were less than the allocation in all other years (Ohio has the lowest possible per capita
cap and is highly industrialized). IDB borrowing rarely exhausts the allocation it is given by the
state's statutes or executive orders, and most states have a procedure for reallocation late in the
year. When reallocation occurs, the remaining borrowing authority from IDBs is transferred to
housing agencies and student loan programs. Utilities and multifamily housing fall somewhere in
between.
With this qualitative data, I returned to the simple calculation of exhausting the cap, and
restated it as follows. Let T be a value that represents the public o±cials' total gain from allocating
cap authority to a category. R is a function that translates this into a rank. The public o±cial
maximizes her utility by fully funding the highest-priority categories, giving the remaining authority
to the marginal category, and possibly denying funding to the least-bene¯cial categories.
max
A
U(A) = TA s.t. Ac · fc(Dc) 8 c and
X
C
Ac · V (9)
Rc = R(T) (10)
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(11)
This concept can be illustrated graphically as in ¯gure 4. The y-axis is the T value, and the public
o±cial sorts the categories from left to right. The width of the areas represents the allocation they
receive, and the category that overlaps the cap is the marginal category. Categories to the right of
the cap do not receive borrowing authority. The assumption that all projects in a category have
equal T values is simplifying. It could be that each project has its own T value, and there is some
overlap of the distributions. However, if all IDB projects can be covered by the cap, and they have
the highest distribution of T values, then IDB is probably not the marginal category. Categories
that receive no funding are also clearly not the marginal category nor the highest-priority category.
From this perspective, we should not expect all types of borrowing to display a close relationship
to the volume cap, even for competitive states. Rather, the volume cap may have no relationship
with the highest- and lowest-priority borrowing and a strong relationship with marginal types of
borrowing.
4 Data
The bond data used in this analysis are from the annual Bond Buyer survey. The Bond Buyer,
a trade publication for the municipal bond industry, has surveyed states each year since 1992
regarding the allocation of their state's private-activity cap authority.7 The survey results reported
how much each state borrowed in each of eight categories.8 It includes only borrowing that is
7The survey was conducted in 1990, but not 1991. I use the data from 1992 onward to avoid an interruption in
the panel.
8In my analysis, I combined the ¯gures for mortgage credit certi¯cates into the much larger mortgage revenue
bond ¯gures. The \Other Housing" ¯gures are included with multifamily housing. The \Other" category is included
17subject to the cap.
Until 1999, all borrowing that was completed with carryforward authority was excluded.9 In
2000, the reported results of the survey changed. From 2000 to 2007, the survey reports a sum of
borrowing done with current-year and carryforward authority. It is not possible, within this dataset,
to disaggregate the ¯gures into the years their authorization originated. One state, Illinois, never
participated in the Bond Buyer survey. For consistency, Illinois is excluded from all descriptive
statistics and analysis in this study.
Throughout the empirical work, I convert dollar ¯gures to year 2000 dollars using the Consumer
Price Index.10 State-population totals are used to change ¯gures into per capita terms and to
categorize states into high-, middle- and low-population categories. The population data are from
the Census Bureau estimates.11 The estimates are based on the decennial census and updated with
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Vital Statistics reports (births and deaths),
and the American Community Surveys after 2000. I use the 1990s population estimates that were
adjusted after the 2000 census, rather than the population estimates published annually in the
1990s. The regional designations assigned to the states are according to the Census Bureau's four
region de¯nitions.
The gross state product data, in aggregate and by category, are from the Regional Economic
Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).12 The BEA calculations are based on data
collected on business activity by the Census Bureau and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. For
in the total borrowing ¯gures, but not in any of the categories.
9A ¯gure was given and labeled as the carryforward to the next year, but it was simply the di®erence between
the cap and total borrowed with the current-year authorization. This ¯gure is not reliable because carryforward
authority is often abandoned.
10http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (Accessed August 30, 2010)
11http://www.census.gov/popest/states/ (Accessed August 30, 2010)
12http://www.bea.gov/regional/ (Accessed August 24, 2010)
18the measures of wage earners and union members, I performed my own calculations using CPS data.
The Minnesota Population Data Center makes available the entire series of the March CPS data
with weights to create count estimates of any measured characteristic by individual or household.13
For the campaign contribution data, I accessed the online database available from the National
Institute on Money in State Politics.14 The institute collects data from all state campaign ¯nance
disclosure agencies. The data can be downloaded in aggregates for state-year-category cells, in-
cluding the categories of manufacturing, utilities, real estate, construction, and education.15 In
most instances, the data re°ect 100% of the donations to candidates for state o±ces. Institute sta®
code the donations by Standard Industrial Classi¯cation. The ¯gures follow the election cycles very
closely, with zero donations generally reported in years when the state has no statewide elections.
The calculation of the contributions per capita made by competing interests are based on the cur-
rent year and the three preceding years, to guarantee there are no years of all-zero observations.
This also re°ects the assumption that political in°uence gained through contributions does not
depreciate immediately.
The control variables originate from a variety of sources. I use the CPS data to estimate
urbanization, college attainment, and low-income status for each state and year. The data on state
and local taxes are from the Census Bureau's Quarterly Summary of State and Local Government
Tax Revenue. I accessed the tax data through the Haver Analytics system, which re°ects all
revisions. From the total taxes I subtracted severance taxes because the incidence of that type
of tax falls primarily on non-residents. Bed and other taxes that fall heavily on tourists are not
13Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, Trent Alexander, Donna Leicach, and Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public Use Mi-
crodata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 2.0. [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota
Population Center [producer and distributor], 2009. http://cps.ipums.org
14National Institute on Money in State Politics. http://www.followthemoney.org/.
15The classi¯cations distinguish post-secondary education contributions. I exclude contributions from primary and
secondary teachers' unions because these groups are not directly concerned with student loans.
19tracked separately; They are included. I use unemployment estimates that the Bureau of Labor
Statistics calculates from the CPS data.16
In the robustness checks, I add additional controls for the college students enrolled per capita
and utilities rate changes. The enrollment data are from the National Center for Education Statis-
tics' Higher Education General Information Survey.17 The electricity and natural gas retail price
data are collected and posted online by the U.S. Energy Information Administration.18 The values
are annual rate changes minus the national average rate change for the year. These are meant to
capture if the utilities in a state were allowed to signi¯cantly raise their prices without confounding
with market-wide energy price shocks. The robustness checks also include estimates with controls
for public-activity and private activity debt burdens. The debt burden data are from the Census
Bureau's Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances.19
For the estimates that control for ¯rst time homebuyers, I used the di®erence between home-
ownership rates in each state at ¯ve-year age intervals. I multiplied these by the population in the
state in those age categories in the year. For example, if in Ohio, 35% of 30-year-olds own homes
while 20% of 25-year-olds own homes, then about 3% of the people aged 26 to 30 are ¯rst time
home buyers in a year. Adding 3% of the 730 thousand people in that state and age group to the
equivalent in the other age groups (21-25, 31-35, and 36-40) and dividing by the total population
gives an estimate of per capita ¯rst time home buyers.
In another variation of the models, I replace the GSP data with a more direct measure of the
market for ¯nancing in the sector. Because most ¯nancing is done in national or international
markets, most data available is not tracked in a relevant manner. For example, an industrial
16http://www.bls.gov/lau/ (Accessed August 24, 2010)
17http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09 207.asp
and equivalent, earlier tables (Accessed September 1, 2010)
18http://www.eia.doe.gov/ (Accessed 23 August, 2010)
19http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/ (Accessed August 25, 2010)
20¯rm may issue bonds from its headquarters in New York and use the proceeds to expand plants
in ¯ve states. Unless the data is disaggregated and reported by the ¯rm, it cannot serve as a
measure of the demand for industrial ¯nancing in Ohio or Indiana. For each of the ¯ve sectors'
demand for ¯nancing, I must use a di®erent measure collected in a di®erent survey. Therefore, the
coe±cients are not comparable across sectors. For industrial development bonds, I use the capital
expenditures ¯gure for the state and year, as estimated from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers
and the Economic Census.20 Unfortunately, there is no complete panel of investment in utilities
infrastructure, so the alternate measure in that estimate is growth in the state's utilities GSP.
Data on new mortgage originations is available from the Inside Mortgage Finance Publications,
Inc. (2009). To represent demand for multifamily housing, I used the value of new construction
of residential buildings with 5 or more units. This data is collected by the Census Bureau and
processed by Haver Analytics.21 The student loan data are publicly available aggregates from the
administrative records of the U.S. Department of Education.22
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
As a ¯rst contact with the data, I present summaries of the states' usage of the cap. Recall that
bonds issued with carryforward authority were excluded before 2000 and included afterward. Table
1 summarizes the ratios of borrowing to the cap, and how often these ratios are above certain
thresholds. The fact that 57% of states in the 2000s were observed borrowing an amount over 85%
of their cap value shows that most states were using most of their cap. The number of observations
20http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/historical data/index.html
http://www.census.gov/econ/census/guide/index.html (Accessed August 25, 2010)
21http://www.census.gov/mcd/ (Accessed August 25, 2010)
22http://www2.ed.gov/¯naid/prof/resources/data/opeloanvol.html (Accessed August 25, 2010)
21with observed borrowing above the cap, due to carryforward, is quite high at 35%. If the borrowing
could be credited to the year it was allocated, the percentage of state-year observations approaching
the cap would be even higher. The cap is more likely to be binding and create a competitive
environment when the ratio is this high.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the state-year observations on per capita borrowing.
We see that industrial borrowing and utilities borrowing have similar means in both time periods,
and both decline in real terms from the ¯rst to the second period. The means of mortgage,
multifamily, and student loan borrowing are all observed at higher levels in the second period.
Figure 5 gives a graphic representation of the national totals by category.
To begin understanding how the per capita cap relates to borrowing, I average the per capita cap
over the study period and assign the states to an above-the-median or below-the-median category.
Table 3 shows how the categories of states di®er in their use of the borrowing authority. States
with more generous per capita caps borrow more for every purpose, with the greatest di®erence in
the mortgage and student loan categories.
To visualize the relationship between the per capita cap and the per capita borrowing, ¯gures
6 and 7 present scatter plots of the data for the grand total and largest subcategory. Positive
relationships are visually suggested by each. However, trends in the dense cloud near the $50 cap
are not clear.
While very few states opt for no private-activity borrowing in any given year (2.2% of all
annual totals are zero), many states opt for no borrowing within speci¯c categories for a year. The
percentage of the state-year observations that show no borrowing are, by category: Industrial 22%,
utilities 39%, mortgage 31%, multifamily 26%, student loans 51%.
Tables 4 and 5 present the descriptive statistics for the covariates. All dollar amounts are
adjusted to 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. The variables in table 4 are the set of
22control variables used in the estimates. They were chosen to capture characteristics and trends in
the economies and political systems of the states. The regional indicators should pick up bench-
marking, which is the tendency of public o±cials, rating agencies, and investors to compare any
given state to similar neighbors. The GSP ¯gure should capture whether the state is generally
wealthy, while the taxes per capita measure re°ects whether it has more active governments. Ur-
banization changes the demand for and cost of projects funded with private-activity bonds. The
percentage of adults with college degrees and its change should re°ect whether the state has an
information-based economy and whether it is attracting skilled migrants. The unemployment, low-
income percentage, and low-income growth variables represent demand for social programs and
job-creating investments. Finally, the population categories are meant to identify economies of
scale. In the campaign contribution data, summarized in table 5, we see that real estate and con-
struction organizations donate heavily to state o±cials. In the unionization data, manufacturing
and construction workers appear to be organized in larger numbers than those in other industries.
Throughout the analysis, I will estimate each model without and with state ¯xed e®ects. It is
common in literature that uses state panels to include a state ¯xed e®ect to capture unobserved
characteristics of the states. However, while there is variation in the per capita volume cap within
states, there is much more variation between states. Including state and year ¯xed e®ects leaves
very little variation for identi¯cation of the parameters. The between standard deviation of the per
capita volume cap is 84.4 while the within standard deviation is only 16.2. Several of the control
variables also have much more between variation than within variation, including urbanization,
per capita GSP, per capita taxes, college attainment, and percentage of households that are low
income. The regional indicators and the population categories (de¯ned over the whole period) have
no within variation. All of the estimates in the analysis account for the fact that the observations
are not strictly independent. In considering which type of model is most appropriate, the stable
23nature of the volume caps should be taken into consideration.
As I progress from descriptive statistics to regression-based models, I need to mention a few
points regarding the estimation techniques. I examined the residual, normal probability, and lever-
age plots for all of the models presented. The plots all displayed similar patterns of heteroskedas-
ticity, with increasing variance of the residuals at the higher levels of borrowing per capita. The
state-clustered standard error correction (see Appendix B) is applied in the results above to allow
for proper inferences. Taking the log of both the outcome and independent variable of interest cor-
rects the heteroskedasticity problem but introduces the issue of how to treat the zero observations.
I present the results of models estimated in both levels and logs.
For the purposes of testing the null hypothesis that the parameters are zero, I would like to have
normally distributed errors that are not serially correlated. I applied the Wooldridge test to the
unadjusted OLS estimates of my models and con¯rmed that there is serial correlation in the panel
data. To correct this, I use the procedure suggested in Bhargava, Franzini, and Narendranathan
(1982), which is similar to a Cochrane-Orcutt correction. The Bhargava corrections is described
in Appendix B. The remaining assumptions of my regression estimates relate to causality and
the exogeneity of the independent variables of interest. I am assuming that projects funded with
private-activity bonds are not large enough to signi¯cantly change the size of the relevant sector. I
assume production and employment levels in an industry cause borrowing authority to be allocated
to that industry, not that bond funding causes the industry activity to be at its observed level.
This is analogous to a price-taker argument.23
23Ninety-nine percent of the ratios of the state-year borrowing total to the state-year sector gross state product, for
manufacturing, utilities, single family homes and multifamily housing, are below .12. For student loans, 90 percent
of the ratios are below .13, but these observations are lumpy. States often make large bond issues for student loans,
and then make no student loan issues in the following two years. Relative to the measures of total sector borrowing
described in section 4, the ratios are higher, but still below .06 for 95 percent of the observations in manufacturing
24This section will present several models in which the dependent variable is the observed per
capita borrowing. It is very important to keep in mind that the carryforward provision complicates
the relationship between the cap, the true borrowing, and the borrowing observed in the Bond
Buyer survey. In Appendix A, I formulate the di®erences between the true value and the survey
results as a measurement error, and I derive the biases this error would introduce in a regression of
the observed borrowing on the cap. With these results in mind, the coe±cients estimated here can
suggest, but not strictly support, a statement such as \for each additional dollar of per capita cap,
$¯ of additional per capita borrowing will occur." The coe±cients may be close to the true dollar-
for-dollar relationship, but they will contain a measurement error bias. Therefore, they should be
interpreted more conservatively as a positive or negative relationship with varying magnitude and
signi¯cance.
The private-activity volume cap should be exogenous to decisions made by states. It is deter-
mined by only two things: a federal regulation and the state's population. The regulation's relative
treatment of the states has been constant since 1986, so there is no chance that particular states
in°uenced it. The increases in volume caps after 2000 were applied uniformly. I partially control
for population by dividing the cap, the borrowing, and the appropriate covariate ¯gures by the
states' populations. If economies of scale exist, they should favor additional borrowing in the states
with higher absolute caps. This would push toward a negative relationship between the per capita
caps and per capita borrowing.
and single and multifamily housing. Student loans again display lumpy observations, with 10 percent being above .4.
In every case, the key question is whether this type of less-expensive funding caused the market to be at its observed
size. If this funding were not available, presumably borrowers would switch to the next least expensive source of
funding and borrow slightly less. The supply curve would be shifted up in the absence of the subsidy, but the demand
would remain the same.
25I am estimating the following reduced-form equation:







¸tY earit + ²it: (12)
Report is a binary variable indicating that the data are from the years 2000 to 2007, rather than
1992 to 1999. The X's are control variables, and Y ear's are dummies for the years. When the
models are estimated for borrowing for the ¯ve main purposes, they are estimated separately, but
the political variables are expressed in relative terms. The number of households with a wage earner
in the industry, the contributions, and the union membership are all divided by the total in the ¯ve
sectors in that state and year. This represents the size or in°uence of the interest groups relative
to other groups that are competing for private activity borrowing authorization.
The ¯rst set of models presented in tables 6 and 7 con¯rm that the private-activity volume cap
does impact total borrowing.24 Models I, II, III, and V include the per capita cap, an indicator for
the second type of reporting (including carryforward borrowing after 1999), and then an interaction
of the two. The relationship between the cap and the observed borrowing appears stronger after
2000, but this is in part because of the reporting di®erence. Adding the year ¯xed e®ects and the
control variables changes the coe±cients on the cap variables only slightly. The coe±cient on the
24This is the extended table note for all regression results. All of the statements in this note apply to all the
regression results unless otherwise noted. All dollar values used in the calculations are adjusted to year 2000 real
dollars using the Consumer Price Index. All estimates on panels are corrected for serial correlation using the Bhargava
procedure (see Appendix B). All standard errors are clustered by state. All private-activity borrowing data are
from the Bond Buyer survey. \Control Variables" refers to a standard set of variables including region indicators,
urbanization, total GSP per capita, state and local taxes per capita, unemployment, college attainment, college
attainment growth, low-income percentage, low-income percentage growth, and population category indicators. See
section 4 for descriptions of the control variables. \Quality Controls" refers to indicators for each observation and
each variable that was imputed.
26report-group indicator is absorbed by the year ¯xed e®ects (throughout the rest of the tables, I do
not display a result for the direct e®ect of Report). It is interesting to note that only a few of the
control variables are individually signi¯cant.
Including state ¯xed e®ects reduces the apparent relationship between the cap and spending.
In the speci¯cation of model IV, only the within-state variation is being used to identify the
coe±cient. The majority of the variation in the independent variable is between states. The
coe±cient on the direct e®ect of the cap is large and negative, but not signi¯cant (-0.75). The
coe±cient on the interaction is large and positive, but the direct and interaction e®ects o®set,
giving a net impact of essentially zero. Given the di®erences seen in the descriptive statistics, this
¯gure seems unreasonably low. Taking the log of the dependent and independent variables gives
another variation on the result, although with a di®erent interpretation. The coe±cient on the
log of the per capita cap in table 7 model V is almost zero. In the later years represented by the
interaction between the report group indicator and the logged per capita cap, the elasticity is just
over one. A 1% increase in the per capita cap was associated with a 1% increase in per capita
borrowing.
The last two models are estimated on the data from each of the report groups separately. The
results are consistent with those of model III. The additional per capita cap was associated with
additional borrowing in the ¯rst period (0.28), and strongly associated in the second period (0.78).
For each of the seven models, I tested whether the sum of the coe±cients on the cap and cap
interaction variable was equal to one. There is evidence to reject that hypothesis in every case,
suggesting that despite the strong relationship between the cap and borrowing, something is still
leading states to not exhaust their cap in a signi¯cant share of the states and years. The situation
is more complex than would be captured by assuming the borrowing is equal to the cap. There
are some di®erences in the impact of the control variables in each era. Higher per capita taxation
27is strongly associated with lower per capita borrowing in the 1990s. After 2000, Borrowing in the
Northeast is signi¯cantly higher than the omitted regional category, the Midwest.
Regression estimates of models of per capita borrowing by purpose are presented in tables 8.
Breaking the analysis down by category reveals that the relationship between the per capita cap
and borrowing is stronger in some categories than in others. Two coe±cients on cap variables are
signi¯cant. After 2000, an additional dollar per capita of volume cap appears to translate into $0.42
of additional mortgage bond borrowing per capita. The cap variables in the student loan results
are jointly signi¯cant. In the ¯rst report group, an additional dollar of per capita cap translated
into $0.10 of additional per capita student loan borrowing. After 2000, the relationship doubles to
$0.21.
While most of the control variables do not have signi¯cant coe±cients, we can see that the
fast-growing states of the South borrowed more per capita for utilities than the Midwestern states.
The Northeastern states borrowed more for student loans. Other things being equal, states with
high total GSP per capita borrowed more for multifamily housing.
In table 9, the results of several variations of the models are presented. The introduction of
state ¯xed e®ects does not change the signi¯cant result in the mortgage revenue data. None of the
other models with state ¯xed e®ects have joint signi¯cance for the cap and the interaction. When
both the per capita cap and the per capita borrowing are transformed into log points, the positive
and signi¯cant relationship between the cap and mortgage borrowing after 2000 remains. The
coe±cients on the cap variables in the student loan model are positive but not highly signi¯cant.
In this speci¯cation, there appears to be negative relationships between the cap and borrowing for
industrial development and multifamily housing, which is not consistent with the theories presented
in section 3.
When running the analysis on only the 1990s' or 2000s' data, I ¯nd consistent, but stronger,
28results in the second reporting period. In the 1990s' estimates, the relationship between the cap
and borrowing is positive for all categories but signi¯cant only for student loans. After 2000, the
positive relationships for industrial, mortgage, and student loan bonds are signi¯cant. To address
concerns that the results might be driven by a few unusual observations, I estimate the models while
excluding the 40 most in°uential observations, as measured by Cook's distance. I also estimate
the models with the ¯ve smallest and ¯ve largest states excluded. The results for mortgage and
student loan borrowing both persist through these restrictions of the sample. The results are also
robust to the removal of all the controls and removing the correction for serial correlation.
Turning now to the political economy models, I add four covariates that could in°uence the
allocation of borrowing authority. The main results are presented in table 10. The variations and
robustness checks are presented in tables 11 through 15. Comparing the results in table 10 to
those in table 8, it is evident that the in°uence of the cap is independent of the political variables
in the mortgage and student loan estimates. The cap coe±cients change only modestly, and the
signi¯cance patterns are the same with the economic and political variables as without. The results
are quite steady through the variations. The variations attempt are (1) adding state-¯xed e®ects, (2)
taking logs of the dependent and independent variables of interest, (3) splitting by reporting period,
(4) trimming in°uential observations, (5) limiting data to the middle 40 states (by population),
(6) including no controls (7) using the Prais-Winston correction for serial correlation, (8) including
political variables in levels instead of shares, (9) using a tobit speci¯cation, (10) controlling for
debt burden, (11) controlling for utility rate changes, (12) controlling for college enrollment, (13)
controlling for ¯rst time homebuyers, and (14) using alternative measures of demand for ¯nancing.
The per capita gross state product in utilities is strongly related to private-activity-bond bor-
rowing for utilities. The coe±cient on the GSP variable is large and signi¯cant in almost all
variations of the estimates. The relationship between the wage earners in manufacturing and in-
29dustrial development borrowing is positive and signi¯cant in every speci¯cation. In the student
loan models, campaign contributions per capita from higher education interests are positively re-
lated to borrowing. The coe±cients are signi¯cant in the baseline model and most of the alternate
speci¯cations. Throughout the estimates with all states pooled together, the coe±cients on the
union measures are inconsistent and never signi¯cant.
Running counter to my hypothesis, the per capita contributions from utilities interests have
strong negative relationship with borrowing for utilities.25 The relationship seems robust and
persists through all variations of the model, even when controls are added for retail energy price
changes (see table 14). The rate increases are important because most utilities are regulated by
state agencies, and attempts to in°uence these agencies certainly involve campaign contributions
(De Figueiredo and Edwards 2007). Utility companies that are aggressively pursuing a rate increase
may delay the ¯nancing of new capacity until the rate increase is approved, leading to the negative
relationship between contributions and borrowing.
Much of the theory in section 3 hinges on the idea that volume cap authority is a scarce resource,
and the results in table 6 support this idea. However, we might expect to see di®erences in the
allocation processes in states with tight caps versus states with generous caps. To investigate this, I
start by averaging the per capita cap of each state over the entire period. Then I identify the median
of the averages and sort each state above or below. I do not allow states to switch groups, so all the
panels are complete. In broad terms, I expect that the economic or political factors will drive the
allocation of borrowing to high-priority uses in industrial development and utilities. This re°ects
the state o±cials allocating authority to economically important sectors or politically in°uential
25I explored the possibility that competition for borrowing authority would induce campaign contributions, leading
to a negative relationship between the two. I did not ¯nd evidence that states with more intense competition for
authority saw more contributions. Using a similar model, it was evident that states with more political competition
(measured by the partisan ratio in their legislatures) did have higher levels of contributions.
30interests. In states with generous caps, the economic measures will still matter for high-priority
borrowing purposes, but the remainder of the de facto subsidy will be directed to lower-priority
uses in mortgage revenue bonds and student loans. In these sectors, the borrowing will be linked
to the volume cap.
Looking at tables 16 and 17, we can see that the cap's association with borrowing in the low-cap
states is di®erent than in the pooled estimates. The only signi¯cant or jointly signi¯cant coe±cients
on the caps are negative (keep in mind, there is very little variance in the per capita cap between
these larger states). The economic and political variables, on the other hand, are predictive,
especially for industrial and utilities borrowing. The gross state product in manufacturing and
utilities has a signi¯cant positive relationship with borrowing for those purposes. The relative
share of wage earners in manufacturing also has a positive, signi¯cant relationship with industrial
development borrowing. Campaign contributions from higher education a±liates are positively
related to student loan borrowing in every low-cap speci¯cation. The union membership variable
has its only signi¯cant coe±cients in the models estimated on the low-cap states before and after
2000. Controlling for the share of households with a manufacturing wage earner, higher union
membership in the population results in lower industrial development borrowing after 2000. Before
2000, union membership in higher education is negatively associated with student loan borrowing.
In the estimates for high-cap states (tables 18 and 19), the link between GSP and utilities bor-
rowing is consistently positive and signi¯cant. In these subsamples the strong negative relationship
between utilities contributions and utilities borrowing is evident (it was not evident in low-cap
states), even when the data are split in two reporting periods. The positive connection between the
cap and mortgage revenue bonds is visible in the high-cap estimates. It is strongest in the second
reporting period. The cap is positively related to student loan lending in both decades.
316 Policy Implications
To assess the impact implied by the models, I calculate predicted values over all data points with
a 10% increase in the volume cap. A 10% increase in the caps is a change of less than one eight of
their standard deviation. When Congress has changed the cap, as in 1986 and 2000, it has taken the
form of a percentage change. I am assuming there are no general equilibrium e®ects with increased
bond o®erings driving up credit costs. The estimates can be found in table 20. In the model of total
borrowing, the 10% increase suggests an additional $6.24 per capita of borrowing in the average
state and year. Aggregated to the national level, this would suggest an additional $844.7 million
in borrowing, a 5.8% increase. In the individual category models, a 10% cap increase implies an
additional $550.6 million for student loans, $363.6 for mortgage revenue bonds, and $143.8 million
for industrial development. As a percentage, the student loan increase is by far the largest, at
28%.26
26The calculations for the predicted values are as follows. Cit is the per capita cap for state i in year t. ¯
¤ is the
coe±cient on the cap. P is population. B is the vector of other parameter estimates. X is the vector of control
variables and ¯xed e®ect indicators. N is the number of states and Q is the number of years.
























The changes in the mean borrowing and annual national borrowing are a smaller percentage of the actual than
the predicted changes in mean per capita borrowing because the smallest changes in the per capita measure C are
weighted by the largest populations, P. Likewise, the largest values of C are weighted by the smallest P values.
327 Conclusions
The analysis that follows the theoretical discussion in this paper establishes that the private-activity
volume cap is a binding constraint on most states, and that it is possible to identify some political
and economic factors that in°uence its allocation. For each additional dollar per capita of private-
activity volume cap, the average state is observed to borrow an additional $0.80 per capita per
year. Some uses of private-activity bonds are more responsive to di®erences in the cap than others.
Speci¯cally, an additional dollar per capita of authority is associated with an additional $0.42 per
capita of mortgage revenue bond borrowing and an additional $0.21 per capita of student loan
borrowing. The models suggest that if the private-activity volume caps were 10% higher, there
would be 28% more student loan bonds issued and just under 8% more mortgage revenue bonds
issued. Total private-activity borrowing would be a little less than 6% higher, or $844 million,
beyond the observed $14.6 billion per year.
The empirical ¯ndings support the theory that the allocation of private activity borrowing
authority is a prioritized process. Borrowing for utilities exhibits a positive relationship with
the utilities GSP in states with tight per capita borrowing limits and those with loose limits.
Likewise, the relative size of the work force in manufacturing seems to drive borrowing for industrial
development even when controlling for the manufacturing GSP. Regardless of the cap, utilities and
manufacturing interests receive authorization if they need it or want it. In models of student
loan and mortgage revenue borrowing, borrowing is strongly connected to the cap, especially in
states with a generous per capita allowance. These categories seem to be absorbing the available
borrowing authority. Explicit political activity only appears to raise authorizations in one instance.
Controlling for productivity and employment in post-secondary education, higher shares of the
campaign contributions raise allocations of borrowing authority to student loans.
33A Measurement Error Bias
This appendix presents a consideration of the measurement error caused by the carryforward au-
thorization. I will show that using the observed borrowing data and the issuing year's cap involves
a measurement error. In each year, a decision is made (by state o±cials, local o±cials, and private
entities) to issue an amount of private-activity debt and carry forward an amount. At the end of
a calendar year, a state can submit a form to the IRS indicating that it plans to carry forward
borrowing authority from the current year, if it has not exhausted its limit. This means that bor-
rowing that occurs in year t could be authorized in the current year, any of the previous three
years, or even a combination of these.
Let the borrowing per capita be represented by A. Let V represent the private-activity volume
authorization per capita. The subscripts will indicate the year the bonds are issued, and the year
the authority to issue them originates, with t as the current or reference year.
Aissue year; authority year Vissue year; authority year (16)
Let s indicate the state observations. I will not include the s subscript, only show when I am
summing over it.
If a state is unconstrained, the volume cap is unrelated to the amount of borrowing, so all
of these calculations only hold assuming the state is constrained. This assumption of a binding
constraint, along with the regulation, makes equation 17 hold. If I were to regress the borrowing
on the volume caps, as in equation 18, I would have a coe±cient of 1.


















b = 1 (20)
34If, instead of the current year borrowing and the carryforward borrowing that will happen, I had
an accurate carryforward ¯gure, then the regression would appear as:


















b = 1: (24)





To simplify the following calculations, without changing their implications, I will assume that
all carryforward is used in the ¯rst year after its authorization year. Let V:;t = Vt;t + Vt+1;t,
A:;t = At;t + At+1;t and A:;t = V:;t. If I run a regression on the 1990s data, I obtain:






























The coe±cient captures the ratio of the covariance between the current year borrowing and the
cap relative to the variance in the cap. We would not expect this to be one, but rather equal to
the portion of the cap that it used in its originating year.
If I run a regression on the 2000s data, I get the following:






























If the process was the same each year, and At;t¡1 = Vt+1;t, then the coe±cient is one. The more
likely relationship is that At;t¡1 is drawn from a related, but slightly lower cap, due to population
growth and the legislated cap increases. That is At;t¡1 » F((1 ¡ ½)V:;t;(1 ¡ ½)2¾2
Vt;t).
This problem can be reformulated as a measurement error problem. Let At;t¡1 = At+1;t ¡ ¢.
Following through the derivation, we have a coe±cient of one minus a bias term. As long as the
di®erence between carryforwards is positively related to the cap, which seems likely, I expect a
coe±cient below one.
































This appendix reviews the standard error corrections that are used in the empirical analyses. To
establish the notation, I am estimating:
y = X¯ + u: (41)
36using
b = (X0X)¡1X0y: (42)
If the errors are homoskedastic, the variance-covariance matrix relating the values of u in all
observations is ¾I were I is the identity matrix.
To allow correct inferences in the presence of heteroskedasticity, the Huber-White procedure
changes the estimate of the standard error using the residuals ei.












var(bOLS) = s2(X0X)¡1: (46)
The robust option down-weights observations with larger errors by employing a calculation that is











Clustering is a variation of robust estimation in which individual eixi are replaced with the sum
in a cluster. Clusters are groups identi¯ed in the data that are likely to have similar errors for
some reason. In this analysis, all observations are clustered by state. Let xi be a row vector of









ei ¤ xi (50)
37The Bhargava procedure consists of calculating a correlation coe±cient (½) for the residuals
in relation to the residuals just before them within the panels. All independent variables and the
dependent variable are adjusted by subtracting the product of ½ and the immediate preceding value.
The ¯rst observation of each panel is adjusted di®erently to avoid losing it. Finally, the regression
is rerun on the adjusted data. Calculation of ½ and the adjustment of the variables is as follows:













it = Yit ¡ ½Yi;t¡1 (52)
X0








(1 ¡ ½2)Xi1: (55)
The Bhargava procedure di®ers from the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure in the calculation of ½.
e0
itei;t¡1 is replaced with (eit ¡ei;t¡1)2, as in the Durbin-Watson statistic. Bhargava, Franzini, and
Narendrathan showed that this is locally most powerful when ½ is near zero.
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40Figure 1: Private Activity Volume Caps in 2000. Data source: The Bond Buyer Yearbook.
Figure 2: Per Capita Private Activity Volume Caps in 1992 and 2007. Data source: The Bond
Buyer Yearbook.
41Figure 3: Per Capita Private Activity Volume Caps, Time Trends in Four States
Figure 4: Prioritization in the Allocation of Private-Activity Borrowing Authority. T is the total
utility the public o±cial obtains from allocating a dollar of private-activity borrowing authority.
The width of the rectangles is determined by the requests made by the private-activity borrowers.
The public o±cial funds the highest priority (highest T) purposes ¯rst, placing them to the left.
Category 4 is the marginal category, which receives an allocation of the di®erence between the
volume cap and the higher priority requests. Category 5 receives no borrowing authority. The
volume cap is exhausted in this state and year.
421992-1999
Current Borrowing/Cap Ratio
Variable Median Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Ratio 0.76 0.65 0.34 0.00 1.00
Ratio > .85 0.00 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Ratio = 1 0.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
2000-2007
Current and Carryforward Borrowing/Cap Ratio
Variable Median Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Ratio 0.90 0.86 0.37 0.00 2.38
Ratio > .85 1.00 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
Ratio > 1 0.00 0.35 0.47 0.00 1.00
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Private-Activity Borrowing/Cap Ratios. The calculations are based
on the Bond Buyer survey data. N=400 in each reporting period.
1992-1999
Per Capita Borrowing Mean SD Min Max
Total 54:642 49:398 0 323:531
Industrial 10:749 13:202 0 118:604
Utilities 11:380 23:646 0 246:831
Mortgage 13:354 24:885 0 196:980
Multifamily 10:246 23:977 0 216:405
Student 7:575 19:669 0 196:980
Other 1:338 4:270 0 38:168
2000-2007
Mean SD Min Max
Total 99:672 94:205 0 613:794
Industrial 7:580 26:384 0 427:359
Utilities 7:935 22:217 0 357:526
Mortgage 43:892 64:954 0 526:724
Multifamily 19:880 34:636 0 291:207
Student 19:045 38:766 0 311:497
Other 1:340 5:051 0 52:216
Per Capita Cap 112:580 87:295 47:996 442:367
Borrowing Imputed 0:014 0:117 0 1
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Private-Activity Borrowing by Purpose. The units are year 2000
dollars per capita. The data are from the Bond Buyer survey. Borrowing using carryforward
authorization is included after 1999. N=400 in each reporting period.
43Figure 5: National Total Private-Activity Borrowing. Figures are in millions of 2000 dollars. The
data are from the Bond Buyer survey. Borrowing using carryforward authorization is included
after 1999.
Per Capita Borrowing
Average Volume Cap Industrial Utilities Mortgage Multifamily Student
Below Median 8:096 7:480 16:190 11:602 6:066
(9:288) (8:282) (17:333) (12:172) (9:074)
Above Median 10:233 11:835 41:056 18:524 20:554
(28:052) (31:314) (68:522) (40:607) (42:048)
Table 3: Private-Activity Borrowing by Purpose and Volume Cap Level. The units are per capita
year 2000 dollars. The states were divided into two categories based on their average per capita
volume cap between 1992 and 2007. All ¯gures are the means of the borrowing observed for the
purpose (column) by states in the volume cap category (row). Standard deviations appear in
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Figure 6: Total Private-Activity Borrowing Per Capita vs. the Per Capita Volume Cap. The
observations are state-year ¯gures. The data are from the Bond Buyer survey. Borrowing using
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Figure 7: Mortgage Bond Borrowing Per Capita vs. the Per Capita Volume Cap. The observations
are state-year ¯gures. The data are from the Bond Buyer survey. Borrowing using carryforward
authorization is included after 1999.
45Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Northeast 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
South 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
West 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Urban 69.26 22.01 17.03 100.00
GSP (all industries) 34.84 13.12 19.99 138.88
Taxes 2.89 0.76 1.67 6.97
Unemployment 5.02 1.38 2.26 11.29
College Graduates 24.79 5.60 11.37 49.95
College Growth 0.43 1.06 -3.29 4.92
Low Income 21.99 5.38 10.55 41.01
Low Income Growth -0.08 1.35 -5.38 4.58
Population < 1.8M 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Population > 5.3M 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Additional Controls added in Robustness Checks
College Enrollment 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.20
First-time Home Buyers 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Public Debt Burden Per Capita 5.40 3.43 0.54 66.67
Private Activity Debt Burden Per Capita 1.70 1.14 0.24 12.71
Debt Burden Data Imputed 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables. The units for GSP and Taxes are logs of year
2000 dollars per capita. Tax ¯gures include all local and state taxes except severance taxes. All
other units are percentages or indicators. N=800.
46Gross State Product Per Capita
Category Mean SD Min Max
Manufacturing (Industrial) 4.610 2.006 0.289 9.815
Utilities 0.802 0.293 0.126 2.316
Real Estate (Mortgage) 3.833 1.679 1.261 14.256
Construction (Multifamily) 1.510 0.454 0.657 4.086
Education (Student Loan) 0.312 0.435 0.046 3.650
Share of Constituent Wage Earners
Category Mean SD Min Max
Manufacturing (Industrial) 46.837 11.919 16.063 70.771
Utilities 4.378 2.266 0.000 18.352
Real Estate (Mortgage) 6.256 3.541 0.540 26.600
Construction (Multifamily) 29.083 9.016 8.906 57.636
Education (Student Loan) 13.446 5.158 3.912 41.090
Share of Constituent Contributions
Category Mean SD Min Max
Manufacturing (Industrial) 13.891 10.351 0.000 99.281
Utilities 16.730 11.396 0.000 100.000
Real Estate (Mortgage) 31.591 12.186 0.000 100.000
Construction (Multifamily) 32.859 11.040 0.000 68.533
Education (Student Loan) 4.929 3.809 -0.163 21.128
Contribution Imputed 0.315 0.465 0.000 1.000
Share of Constituent Union Members
Category Mean SD Min Max
Manufacturing (Industrial) 43.710 30.774 0.000 100.000
Utilities 10.000 14.700 0.000 100.000
Real Estate (Mortgage) 1.193 4.263 0.000 47.812
Construction (Multifamily) 30.583 26.644 0.000 100.000
Education (Student Loan) 12.514 17.353 0.000 100.000
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Political and Economic Variables. The contribution data are in
year 2000 dollars per capita. The contribution data are from the National Institute on Money in
State Politics. The GSP data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis calculations based on
the Survey of Current Business. The GSP units are thousands of year 2000 dollars per capita.
The union member and wage earner data are estimated using the Current Population Survey and
weights provided by the Minnesota Population Data Center. Households are counted if they have
any wage earner employed in the indicated industry. Households can have wage earners in multiple
industries. N=800.
47I II III IV
Cap PC 0:206¤¤¤ 0:216¤¤¤ 0:238 ¤ ¤ ¡0:752
(0:068) (0:075) (0:106) (0:483)
Report ¡21:531¤¤¤
(6:257)
Cap*Report 0:546¤¤¤ 0:553¤¤¤ 0:563¤¤¤ 0:710¤¤¤









GSP PC ¡0:129 ¡3:074 ¤ ¤
(0:460) (1:262)






College Growth ¡3:559 ¡3:567
(2:362) (3:284)
Low Income ¡0:779 ¡0:076
(0:616) (1:698)
Low Income Growth ¡0:699 ¡1:963
(2:049) (2:269)
Population < 1.8M ¡8:168 148:458
(9:286) (108:882)
Population > 5.3M ¡1:708 ¡245:623 ¤ ¤
(3:267) (104:743)
Quality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes
Constant 24:034¤¤¤ ¡11:111 62:792¤¤¤ 115:072
(3:500) (7:456) (19:588) (77:237)
R
2 0:382 0:441 0:473 0:553
F test - Cap Variables 53:80 52:78 32:56 15:37
p 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Table 6: Regression Results: Total Per Capita Borrowing|Per Capita Cap. The dependent variable
is the observed total per capita private-activity borrowing. Additional, extensive notes relevant to
all regression tables appear in note 24. N=800. The F tests evaluate the joint signi¯cance of Cap
and Cap ¤ Report. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Northeast 0:253 4:991 24:812 ¤ ¤
(0:156) (13:090) (10:215)
South ¡0:246 ¤ ¤ ¡12:628 2:815
(0:115) (9:429) (9:043)
West ¡0:142 ¡2:832 10:360
(0:141) (13:362) (12:887)
Urbanization 0:001 0:154 ¡0:614 ¤ ¤
(0:003) (0:239) (0:264)
GSP PC 0:007 1:017 ¡0:853¤
(0:008) (0:745) (0:471)
Taxes PC ¡0:343 ¤ ¤ ¡28:689¤¤¤ ¡3:359
(0:137) (7:872) (8:163)
Unemployment 0:081 8:615 ¤ ¤ 2:683
(0:049) (3:322) (3:775)
College ¡0:014 ¡1:704 1:836
(0:016) (1:292) (1:194)
College Growth ¡0:067 ¡4:070 ¡2:492
(0:048) (3:150) (2:470)
Low Income ¡0:011 ¡1:765¤ ¡0:184
(0:010) (0:881) (1:007)
Low Income Growth ¡0:031 0:486 ¡2:015
(0:027) (1:778) (3:553)
Population < 1.8M ¡0:320 ¡17:981¤ ¡9:938
(0:206) (9:781) (12:375)
Population > 5.3M ¡0:093 ¡11:410 ¤ ¤ 3:070
(0:089) (5:425) (4:350)
Quality Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0:465 94:320¤¤¤ 2:689
(0:830) (20:576) (29:126)
R
2 0:225 0:198 0:560
N 800 400 400
F test - Cap Variables 14:36
p 0:000
Table 7: Regression Results: Total Per Capita Borrowing|Per Capita Cap. The dependent variable
is the observed total per capita private-activity borrowing. Additional, extensive notes relevant to
all regression tables appear in note 24. The F tests evaluate the joint signi¯cance of Cap and
Cap ¤ Report. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
49Industry Utilities Mortgage Multifamily Student
Cap 0:046 0:058 0:074 ¡0:045 0:099 ¤ ¤
(0:031) (0:041) (0:077) (0:075) (0:048)
Cap*Report 0:064 ¡0:007 0:342¤¤¤ 0:078 0:114
(0:043) (0:018) (0:101) (0:087) (0:075)
Northeast 5:375 1:089 ¡17:126¤¤¤ 2:402 21:695¤¤¤
(5:259) (3:418) (5:696) (4:304) (7:823)
South 5:056 8:645¤¤¤ ¡15:723¤¤¤ ¡1:626 2:617
(3:545) (2:717) (5:302) (3:500) (4:843)
West 7:714 7:589 ¡19:879¤¤¤ 0:337 7:625
(7:587) (4:641) (5:692) (4:945) (6:493)
Urbanization ¡0:153 0:034 0:257 ¡0:079 ¡0:188
(0:099) (0:066) (0:179) (0:152) (0:144)
GSP PC 0:248 ¡0:009 ¡0:668¤ 0:716¤¤¤ ¡0:513
(0:256) (0:148) (0:357) (0:236) (0:385)
Taxes PC 2:121 1:143 ¡6:362 ¡4:493 ¡5:458 ¤ ¤
(2:832) (2:889) (3:942) (4:602) (2:471)
Unemployment ¡0:636 1:604 ¡0:123 2:882 1:043
(1:144) (1:127) (2:411) (2:107) (1:053)
College ¡1:306 ¡1:277¤¤¤ 1:389 ¤ ¤ 0:673 1:068
(0:908) (0:475) (0:642) (0:498) (0:845)
College Growth 0:055 2:067¤¤¤ ¡2:013 ¡2:294 ¡2:076
(0:625) (0:733) (1:589) (1:495) (1:456)
Low Income ¡0:771¤ ¡0:888¤¤¤ 0:671 ¡0:188 0:276
(0:392) (0:267) (0:685) (0:538) (0:426)
Low Income Growth 0:706 1:070 ¡0:022 ¡1:842 ¡0:536
(0:680) (0:747) (1:286) (1:127) (0:515)
Population < 1.8M ¡14:020¤ 0:639 9:202 8:826 ¡9:604¤
(8:021) (6:507) (5:847) (5:894) (5:545)
Population > 5.3M ¡0:012 2:245 ¡6:660 ¤ ¤ 2:901 0:957
(2:058) (1:888) (3:292) (2:660) (2:578)
Quality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 26:653 ¤ ¤ 32:911¤¤¤ ¡1:153 ¡9:441 3:594
(11:757) (11:232) (14:841) (9:162) (10:811)
R
2 0:104 0:121 0:303 0:122 0:215
F test - Cap Variables 1:54 1:09 19:96 0:43 3:12
p 0:2250 0:3459 0:000 0:6547 0:0531
Table 8: Regression Results: Per Capita Borrowing by Purpose|Per Capita Cap. The dependent
variable is the observed per capita private-activity borrowing, for the indicated purpose. Additional,
extensive notes relevant to all regression tables appear in note 24. N=800. The F tests evaluate
the joint signi¯cance of Cap and Cap ¤ Report. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by
state and corrected for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
50Industry Utilities Mortgage Multifamily Student
State Fixed E®ects
Cap ¡0:265¤ 0:063 ¡0:065 ¡0:197 ¡0:199
(0:152) (0:148) (0:222) (0:303) (0:121)
Cap*Report 0:086¤ 0:001 0:385¤¤¤ 0:093 0:141
(0:047) (0:028) (0:084) (0:101) (0:087)
Logs
Cap ¡0:418 ¤ ¤ ¡0:345 ¡0:340 ¡0:699 ¤ ¤ 0:838¤
(0:194) (0:410) (0:525) (0:346) (0:495)
Cap*Report 0:305 0:093 1:238¤¤¤ 0:090 0:336
(0:227) (0:179) (0:359) (0:331) (0:294)
1992-1999
Cap 0:005 0:060 0:107 0:010 0:111¤¤¤
(0:015) (0:038) (0:087) (0:063) (0:040)
2000-2007
Cap 0:127 ¤ ¤ 0:042 0:388¤¤¤ 0:034 0:196 ¤ ¤
(0:051) (0:041) (0:081) (0:044) (0:075)
Trimmed Data
Cap ¡0:016 ¡0:009 ¡0:034 ¡0:059¤¤¤ 0:058¤
(0:016) (0:018) (0:039) (0:022) (0:032)
Cap*Report 0:018 0:006 0:341¤¤¤ 0:026 0:075 ¤ ¤
(0:016) (0:010) (0:039) (0:024) (0:029)
Middle States
Cap 0:021 0:000 ¡0:119 ¤ ¤ 0:121 0:116¤¤¤
(0:025) (0:051) (0:046) (0:077) (0:041)
Cap*Report ¡0:027 ¡0:028 0:537¤¤¤ ¡0:024 0:059
(0:024) (0:041) (0:075) (0:102) (0:108)
No Correction for Serial Correlation
Cap 0:035 0:058 0:089 ¡0:032 0:129 ¤ ¤
(0:024) (0:041) (0:083) (0:059) (0:059)
Cap*Report 0:048 ¡0:007 0:327¤¤¤ 0:057 0:099
(0:038) (0:018) (0:094) (0:062) (0:071)
No Controls
Cap 0:013 0:041 0:064 0:035 0:046 ¤ ¤
(0:024) (0:025) (0:039) (0:047) (0:020)
Cap*Report 0:074 ¡0:006 0:326¤¤¤ 0:086 0:115
(0:050) (0:020) (0:103) (0:096) (0:076)
Table 9: Robustness Checks: Per Capita Borrowing by Purpose|Per Capita Cap. The dependent
variable is the observed per capita private-activity borrowing. Additional, extensive notes relevant
to all regression tables appear in note 24. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state
and corrected for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
51Industry Utilities Mortgage Multifamily Student
Cap 0:053 0:023 0:080 ¡0:047 0:105 ¤ ¤
(0:032) (0:021) (0:086) (0:078) (0:045)
Cap*Report 0:054 ¡0:014 0:341¤¤¤ 0:087 0:116
(0:041) (0:023) (0:104) (0:091) (0:075)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:640 19:570¤¤¤ 2:379 1:310 15:887
(0:733) (2:387) (4:094) (3:535) (13:767)
Wage Earners 0:228 ¤ ¤ 0:904¤ ¡0:031 0:356 ¡0:232
(0:091) (0:507) (0:773) (0:402) (0:343)
Contributions ¡0:003 ¡0:181¤¤¤ ¡0:032 0:014 0:764¤
(0:080) (0:047) (0:161) (0:105) (0:441)
Union Members ¡0:010 0:016 0:236 0:033 0:016
(0:017) (0:029) (0:437) (0:042) (0:036)
Northeast 4:065 ¡2:556 ¡18:818¤¤¤ 3:859 14:820 ¤ ¤
(4:938) (2:249) (6:589) (4:331) (6:166)
South 4:462 4:643 ¤ ¤ ¡16:993¤¤¤ ¡2:662 4:468
(3:001) (1:876) (5:100) (3:658) (4:634)
West 6:965 6:566¤¤¤ ¡22:082¤¤¤ ¡0:330 9:875
(6:461) (2:262) (6:208) (4:977) (6:129)
Urbanization ¡0:151 ¡0:001 0:223 ¡0:092 ¡0:175
(0:097) (0:041) (0:196) (0:172) (0:128)
Total GSP PC 0:262 0:043 ¡0:777¤ 0:783¤¤¤ ¡1:020
(0:275) (0:130) (0:435) (0:275) (0:659)
Taxes PC 2:126 0:107 ¡7:890 ¡4:696 ¡3:175
(2:596) (2:031) (4:748) (4:778) (2:682)
Unemployment ¡0:294 0:927 ¡0:105 2:253 0:808
(1:043) (0:693) (2:410) (1:740) (1:130)
College ¡1:256 ¡0:991¤¤¤ 1:265¤ 0:653 0:837
(0:967) (0:268) (0:668) (0:476) (0:812)
College Growth ¡0:049 2:126¤¤¤ ¡1:878 ¡2:140 ¡1:916
(0:639) (0:700) (1:539) (1:398) (1:395)
Low Income ¡0:759¤ ¡0:766¤¤¤ 0:744 ¡0:085 ¡0:040
(0:416) (0:197) (0:671) (0:535) (0:394)
Low Income Growth 0:652 0:939 ¡0:158 ¡1:879¤ ¡0:292
(0:688) (0:661) (1:382) (1:095) (0:513)
Population < 1.8M ¡14:125 0:858 7:525 7:373 ¡8:804
(8:729) (2:778) (6:569) (6:397) (6:141)
Population > 5.3M ¡0:298 2:706 ¤ ¤ ¡7:499 ¤ ¤ 3:272 2:072
(1:954) (1:287) (3:395) (2:809) (2:556)
Quality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 21:315 17:443¤¤¤ 2:113 ¡25:193 ¤ ¤ 5:229
(15:211) (5:961) (14:730) (10:286) (14:869)
R
2 0:109 0:191 0:304 0:132 0:231
F test - Cap Variables 1:59 0:61 21:99 0:49 3:51
p 0:214 0:545 0:000 0:613 0:038
F test - P&E Variables 3:10 21:10 0:24 0:61 1:76
p 0:024 0:000 0:912 0:660 0:153
Table 10: Regression Results: Per Capita Borrowing by Purpose|Cap and Political and Economic
Variables. The dependent variable is the observed per capita private-activity borrowing, for the
indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all regression tables appear in note 24.
N=800. The ¯rst row of F tests evaluate the joint signi¯cance of Cap and Cap ¤ Report. The
second row of F tests evaluate the joint signi¯cance of the GSP, wage earner, contributions and
union member variables. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for
serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
52Industry Utilities Mortgage Multifamily Student
State Fixed E®ects
Cap ¡0:248 0:063 ¡0:057 ¡0:218 ¡0:246¤
(0:151) (0:149) (0:232) (0:309) (0:130)
Cap*Report 0:074 0:002 0:397¤¤¤ 0:102 0:149
(0:047) (0:029) (0:085) (0:105) (0:093)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:149 ¡2:476 6:333 3:227 6:563
(0:761) (10:516) (9:087) (5:457) (25:628)
Wage Earners 0:253 ¤ ¤ 0:075 0:277 0:606 ¡0:105
(0:112) (0:879) (1:069) (0:410) (0:221)
Contributions 0:020 ¡0:145 ¤ ¤ ¡0:077 ¡0:120 1:700 ¤ ¤
(0:094) (0:064) (0:199) (0:132) (0:716)
Union Members ¡0:014 0:020 0:218 0:021 ¡0:010
(0:017) (0:036) (0:516) (0:041) (0:044)
Logs
Cap ¡0:186 ¡0:550 ¡0:300 ¡0:661 ¤ ¤ 0:884¤
(0:201) (0:358) (0:531) (0:290) (0:497)
Cap*Report 0:205 0:043 1:269¤¤¤ 0:059 0:307
(0:236) (0:176) (0:356) (0:317) (0:302)
Sector GSP PC 0:252 1:792¤¤¤ 1:159 1:742¤¤¤ 1:141
(0:178) (0:393) (0:935) (0:647) (1:127)
Wage Earners 0:019¤¤¤ 0:006 0:012 0:003 ¡0:017
(0:004) (0:030) (0:031) (0:012) (0:019)
Contributions ¡0:002 ¡0:006 ¡0:004 ¡0:002 0:059¤¤¤
(0:005) (0:005) (0:006) (0:005) (0:019)
Union Members ¡0:001 0:002 ¡0:006 0:000 ¡0:002
(0:001) (0:004) (0:012) (0:003) (0:003)
1992-1999
Cap 0:011 0:036 0:116 0:026 0:141¤¤¤
(0:016) (0:024) (0:092) (0:068) (0:041)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:018 14:459¤¤¤ 1:590 3:539 1:890
(0:649) (3:257) (2:981) (5:306) (12:614)
Wage Earners 0:239 ¤ ¤ 0:181 0:062 0:117 ¡0:751¤
(0:118) (0:500) (0:793) (0:307) (0:429)
Contributions ¡0:019 ¡0:162¤¤¤ ¡0:141 0:067 0:342
(0:062) (0:057) (0:094) (0:112) (0:329)
Union Members ¡0:020 0:062 ¡0:121 0:051 ¡0:050
(0:029) (0:067) (0:090) (0:089) (0:068)
2000-2007
Cap 0:123 ¤ ¤ ¡0:019 0:386¤¤¤ 0:044 0:189 ¤ ¤
(0:051) (0:018) (0:082) (0:048) (0:076)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:805 24:605¤¤¤ 5:503 ¡0:905 17:949
(1:113) (3:504) (6:444) (4:454) (13:655)
Wage Earners 0:135 2:336¤ ¡1:323 0:631 0:822
(0:081) (1:187) (1:525) (0:731) (0:586)
Contributions 0:010 ¡0:206 ¤ ¤ 0:009 0:089 1:073
(0:190) (0:081) (0:325) (0:197) (0:910)
Union Members 0:004 0:022 0:281 0:069 0:033
(0:031) (0:050) (0:668) (0:073) (0:061)
Table 11: Robustness Checks: Per Capita Borrowing by Purpose |Cap and Political and Eco-
nomic Variables. The dependent variable is the observed per capita private-activity borrowing.
Additional, extensive notes relevant to all regression tables appear in note 24. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Trimmed Data
Cap ¡0:012 ¡0:020 ¡0:050 ¡0:057 ¤ ¤ 0:069
(0:016) (0:016) (0:033) (0:023) (0:043)
Cap*Report 0:018 0:006 0:373¤¤¤ 0:033 0:067¤
(0:015) (0:011) (0:039) (0:024) (0:033)
Sector GSP PC 0:252 12:799¤¤¤ ¡2:928 3:479 13:765 ¤ ¤
(0:386) (2:313) (1:757) (2:134) (6:342)
Wage Earners 0:150¤¤¤ 0:438¤ 0:592¤ 0:171 ¡0:130
(0:037) (0:240) (0:348) (0:105) (0:191)
Contributions 0:020 ¡0:045 0:021 ¡0:027 0:491¤
(0:044) (0:036) (0:077) (0:061) (0:274)
Union Members ¡0:010 0:027 0:196 ¡0:006 ¡0:008
(0:011) (0:027) (0:197) (0:023) (0:025)
Middle States
Cap 0:020 0:014 ¡0:116 ¤ ¤ 0:164 ¤ ¤ 0:090¤
(0:020) (0:048) (0:050) (0:062) (0:047)
Cap*Report ¡0:032 ¡0:036 0:539¤¤¤ ¡0:023 0:066
(0:023) (0:044) (0:075) (0:098) (0:111)
Sector GSP PC 0:586 14:194¤¤¤ ¡3:943 14:588¤¤¤ 7:672
(0:391) (4:106) (3:016) (2:368) (11:849)
Wage Earners 0:172¤¤¤ ¡0:114 0:271 0:007 0:272
(0:052) (0:328) (0:548) (0:174) (0:235)
Contributions 0:049 ¡0:203¤ 0:035 0:063 0:503
(0:058) (0:106) (0:153) (0:085) (0:353)
Union Members ¡0:015 0:043 0:033 ¡0:006 0:017
(0:012) (0:050) (0:262) (0:045) (0:036)
No Controls
Cap 0:032 0:008 0:070 0:033 0:054 ¤ ¤
(0:027) (0:022) (0:042) (0:038) (0:023)
Cap*Report 0:064 ¡0:005 0:330¤¤¤ 0:087 0:120
(0:050) (0:027) (0:103) (0:093) (0:073)
Sector GSP PC 0:551 17:973¤¤¤ ¡3:052¤ 4:350 ¡10:333¤
(0:562) (4:084) (1:586) (3:056) (5:204)
Wage Earners 0:246 ¤ ¤ 1:586¤¤¤ 0:006 0:288 ¡0:018
(0:107) (0:588) (0:755) (0:400) (0:300)
Contributions ¡0:075 ¡0:162¤¤¤ ¡0:010 0:080 1:573¤¤¤
(0:129) (0:059) (0:135) (0:116) (0:475)
Union Members ¡0:005 0:026 0:215 0:026 0:049
(0:017) (0:039) (0:454) (0:041) (0:046)
Table 12: Robustness Checks: Per Capita Borrowing by Purpose |Cap and Political and Economic
Variables. The dependent variable is the observed per capita private-activity borrowing, for the
indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all regression tables appear in note 24.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial correlation. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Prais Winston Corretion for Serial Correlation
Cap 0:054 0:025 0:081 ¡0:046 0:106 ¤ ¤
(0:033) (0:022) (0:086) (0:076) (0:045)
Cap*Report 0:055 ¡0:016 0:341¤¤¤ 0:084 0:115
(0:042) (0:023) (0:103) (0:087) (0:074)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:666 19:765¤¤¤ 2:148 1:652 15:968
(0:733) (2:421) (3:978) (3:484) (13:795)
Wage Earners 0:226 ¤ ¤ 0:914¤ ¡0:022 0:368 ¡0:241
(0:090) (0:496) (0:729) (0:398) (0:345)
Contributions ¡0:000 ¡0:184¤¤¤ ¡0:046 0:005 0:757¤
(0:081) (0:048) (0:164) (0:104) (0:438)
Union Members ¡0:010 0:010 0:224 0:031 0:016
(0:017) (0:029) (0:435) (0:043) (0:036)
Wage Earner, Contribution and Union Data in Levels
Cap 0:047 0:011 0:082 ¡0:038 0:105 ¤ ¤
(0:031) (0:022) (0:081) (0:078) (0:045)
Report 0:000 6:988 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (4:637) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Cap*Report 0:059 ¡0:008 0:339¤¤¤ 0:081 0:117
(0:044) (0:023) (0:104) (0:091) (0:076)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:622 20:252¤¤¤ 3:489 1:665 17:829
(0:641) (2:296) (4:321) (3:419) (13:433)
Wage Earners 0:090¤ 0:348 0:232 0:266 ¡0:035
(0:048) (0:428) (0:718) (0:248) (0:271)
Contributions ¡3:155 ¡7:751¤¤¤ ¡6:450 4:026 22:241
(7:171) (2:012) (4:466) (6:410) (22:108)
Union Members ¡0:031 0:279 0:844 ¡0:298¤ ¡0:627
(0:065) (0:318) (1:112) (0:176) (0:391)
Tobit Speci¯cation
Cap ¡0:412¤ 0:006 ¡0:192 ¡0:318 ¡0:553¤¤¤
(0:229) (0:226) (0:366) (0:339) (0:194)
Cap*Report 0:096¤ ¡0:004 0:553¤¤¤ 0:135 0:206
(0:056) (0:052) (0:100) (0:113) (0:128)
Sector GSP PC 0:252 ¡10:688 7:832 6:555 ¡26:728
(1:450) (13:315) (11:805) (8:146) (53:044)
Wage Earners 0:297¤ ¡0:288 0:315 0:882¤ ¡0:919
(0:156) (1:136) (1:245) (0:454) (0:702)
Contributions ¡0:009 ¡0:234¤ ¡0:317 ¡0:292 2:862¤¤¤
(0:108) (0:131) (0:306) (0:179) (1:053)
Union Members ¡0:035 0:071 ¡0:250 ¡0:022 ¡0:078
(0:032) (0:092) (0:657) (0:060) (0:089)
Table 13: Robustness Checks. The dependent variable is the observed per capita private-activity
borrowing, for the indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all regression tables
appear in note 24. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
55Industry Utilities Mortgage Multifamily Student
Controlling for the Debt Burden
Cap 0:056 0:022 0:106 ¡0:094 0:103¤
(0:041) (0:022) (0:079) (0:074) (0:053)
Cap*Report 0:053 ¡0:014 0:335¤¤¤ 0:094 0:116
(0:040) (0:023) (0:103) (0:086) (0:072)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:595 19:639¤¤¤ 1:020 0:847 16:348
(0:701) (2:328) (4:629) (4:679) (11:895)
Wage Earners 0:224 ¤ ¤ 0:892 ¡0:123 0:332 ¡0:239
(0:086) (0:534) (0:783) (0:383) (0:329)
Contributions ¡0:006 ¡0:179¤¤¤ ¡0:002 ¡0:009 0:748¤
(0:081) (0:052) (0:167) (0:095) (0:410)
Union Members ¡0:010 0:016 0:225 0:035 0:017
(0:017) (0:029) (0:442) (0:042) (0:036)
Pub Act Debt ¡0:309 0:010 ¡0:573 ¡0:208 ¡0:013
(0:235) (0:144) (0:378) (0:372) (0:261)
Priv Act Debt ¡0:171 0:116 ¡2:803 5:374¤¤¤ 0:268
(1:426) (1:078) (1:945) (1:105) (2:413)
Debt Data Missing ¡1:481 6:804¤¤¤ 0:735 ¡8:866 ¡9:774 ¤ ¤
(2:714) (1:921) (8:998) (5:980) (3:668)
Controlling for Regulated Utility Rate Changes
Cap 0:051 0:023 0:080 ¡0:049 0:102 ¤ ¤
(0:031) (0:022) (0:086) (0:079) (0:045)
Cap*Report 0:053 ¡0:014 0:343¤¤¤ 0:086 0:116
(0:041) (0:023) (0:105) (0:090) (0:074)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:676 19:552¤¤¤ 1:917 1:331 16:077
(0:738) (2:391) (4:110) (3:518) (13:566)
Wage Earners 0:228 ¤ ¤ 0:911¤ ¡0:072 0:350 ¡0:217
(0:090) (0:504) (0:765) (0:400) (0:337)
Contributions ¡0:003 ¡0:181¤¤¤ ¡0:033 0:015 0:774¤
(0:079) (0:047) (0:162) (0:102) (0:444)
Union Members ¡0:010 0:017 0:247 0:034 0:016
(0:017) (0:029) (0:432) (0:043) (0:037)
Elec Rate Change ¡16:190 5:154 29:486 ¡23:919 ¡18:787
(11:305) (11:664) (48:140) (24:151) (19:927)
Gas Rate Change ¡0:658 ¡0:482 6:040 6:744 6:991
(3:299) (4:527) (10:258) (12:586) (13:603)
Table 14: Robustness Checks. The dependent variable is the observed per capita private-activity
borrowing, for the indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all regression tables
appear in note 24. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Controlling for College Enrollment
Cap 0:048 0:019 0:016 0:039 0:097 ¤ ¤
(0:031) (0:030) (0:087) (0:052) (0:040)
Cap*Report 0:044 ¡0:013 0:404¤¤¤ ¡0:006 0:136
(0:052) (0:029) (0:108) (0:039) (0:083)
Sector GSP PC ¡1:074 19:831¤¤¤ 0:465 4:636 32:081
(1:020) (2:188) (3:272) (3:341) (22:233)
Wage Earners 0:253 ¤ ¤ 0:962¤ 0:803 0:238 ¡0:217
(0:095) (0:537) (0:679) (0:392) (0:355)
Contributions 0:023 ¡0:193¤¤¤ ¡0:070 0:056 0:765¤
(0:075) (0:062) (0:155) (0:109) (0:442)
Union Members ¡0:019 0:019 ¡0:203 0:033 0:005
(0:016) (0:032) (0:408) (0:044) (0:037)
Col Enroll PC 19:081 96:816 246:022 ¡79:639 ¡161:975
(117:268) (94:605) (319:243) (340:661) (158:460)
Controlling for First Time Home Buyers
Cap 0:049 0:023 0:078 ¡0:047 0:106 ¤ ¤
(0:030) (0:021) (0:091) (0:078) (0:046)
Cap*Report 0:053 ¡0:014 0:335¤¤¤ 0:088 0:117
(0:041) (0:023) (0:104) (0:091) (0:076)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:809 19:575¤¤¤ 3:961 1:255 16:296
(0:874) (2:382) (3:531) (3:514) (14:489)
Wage Earners 0:223 ¤ ¤ 0:907¤ 0:228 0:352 ¡0:238
(0:086) (0:512) (0:892) (0:398) (0:354)
Contributions ¡0:009 ¡0:182¤¤¤ ¡0:021 0:007 0:760¤
(0:082) (0:047) (0:161) (0:109) (0:444)
Union Members ¡0:011 0:017 0:250 0:032 0:015
(0:017) (0:030) (0:443) (0:042) (0:036)
FT Home Buyer 8:356 0:562 36:685 ¡4:716 ¡6:377
(11:694) (7:238) (27:741) (19:111) (19:383)
Alternative Measures of Demand for Financing
Cap 0:096 0:042 0:102 ¡0:047 0:170 ¤ ¤
(0:058) (0:029) (0:093) (0:080) (0:073)
Cap*Report 0:030 ¡0:002 0:313¤¤¤ 0:088 0:000
(0:037) (0:022) (0:111) (0:090) (0:000)
Borrowing Measure 2:925 ¡8:278 ¡1:383 6:680 25:007
(4:328) (9:186) (0:953) (22:365) (23:061)
Wage Earners 0:156¤ 1:582¤ 0:135 0:362 0:934
(0:079) (0:848) (0:978) (0:396) (0:597)
Contributions 0:044 ¡0:087 0:001 0:013 1:125
(0:170) (0:071) (0:196) (0:106) (0:921)
Union Members 0:000 0:029 0:228 0:032 0:032
(0:024) (0:032) (0:471) (0:042) (0:061)
N 550 800 700 800 400
Table 15: Robustness Checks. The dependent variable is the observed per capita private-activity
borrowing, for the indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all regression tables
appear in note 24. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial
correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Main Speci¯cation
Cap ¡0:450 0:846 0:693 ¡0:975¤ 0:319
(0:482) (0:624) (0:779) (0:476) (0:435)
Cap*Report 0:428 ¡1:634 ¤ ¤ 0:322 0:126 ¡0:203
(0:545) (0:687) (0:959) (0:555) (0:520)
Sector GSP PC 1:824¤¤¤ 8:307¤¤¤ ¡0:465 1:090 ¡6:227
(0:477) (2:667) (2:724) (3:634) (6:187)
Wage Earners 0:240¤¤¤ ¡0:250 0:345 0:042 0:092
(0:072) (0:407) (0:505) (0:088) (0:293)
Contributions 0:031 0:006 ¡0:048 ¡0:079 0:403 ¤ ¤
(0:049) (0:086) (0:138) (0:063) (0:147)
Union Members ¡0:025¤ ¡0:034 ¡0:127 0:002 ¡0:002
(0:014) (0:024) (0:151) (0:022) (0:023)
F test - Cap Variables 0:47 4:36 1:27 2:95 0:29
p 0:633 0:024 0:298 0:072 0:753
F test - P&E Variables 6:06 3:24 0:25 0:46 2:09
p 0:002 0:030 0:904 0:764 0:113
State Fixed E®ects
Cap ¡0:419 0:931 0:565 ¡0:940¤ 0:342
(0:461) (0:611) (0:775) (0:480) (0:420)
Cap*Report 0:456 ¡1:668 ¤ ¤ 0:492 0:090 ¡0:273
(0:524) (0:679) (0:989) (0:568) (0:530)
Sector GSP PC 1:823¤¤¤ 8:724¤¤¤ ¡0:643 1:422 ¡7:137
(0:477) (2:506) (2:749) (3:422) (6:292)
Wage Earners 0:247¤¤¤ ¡0:261 0:573 0:044 0:121
(0:078) (0:380) (0:515) (0:093) (0:297)
Contributions 0:026 0:009 ¡0:058 ¡0:080 0:430¤¤¤
(0:053) (0:091) (0:141) (0:065) (0:152)
Union Members ¡0:025¤ ¡0:035 ¡0:165 ¡0:004 ¡0:001
(0:014) (0:024) (0:152) (0:023) (0:028)
Table 16: Regression Results: Low Cap States. The dependent variable is the observed per capita
private-activity borrowing, for the indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all
regression tables appear in note 24. N=400. The ¯rst row of F tests evaluate the joint signi¯cance
of Cap and Cap¤Report. The second row of F tests evaluate the joint signi¯cance of the GSP, wage
earner, contributions and union member variables. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered
by state and corrected for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Logs
Cap ¡5:281 4:003 3:438 ¡2:395 3:539
(3:112) (4:306) (4:317) (2:997) (4:125)
Cap*Report 5:681 ¡8:743¤ ¡2:747 ¡1:606 ¡1:207
(3:544) (4:983) (5:494) (3:427) (5:488)
Sector GSP PC 0:724 ¤ ¤ 1:915 ¤ ¤ 0:417 1:681 ¤ ¤ ¡2:775 ¤ ¤
(0:343) (0:718) (1:363) (0:604) (1:245)
Wage Earners 0:022¤¤¤ ¡0:040 0:072 ¡0:000 0:030
(0:008) (0:048) (0:046) (0:008) (0:036)
Contributions 0:001 ¡0:017 ¡0:001 ¡0:006 0:073¤¤¤
(0:003) (0:011) (0:011) (0:005) (0:020)
Union Members ¡0:004 ¤ ¤ ¡0:007 ¡0:006 ¡0:000 ¡0:002
(0:002) (0:005) (0:011) (0:002) (0:003)
1992-1999
Cap ¡0:370 0:965 0:861 ¡0:693 0:355
(0:463) (0:674) (0:686) (0:473) (0:384)
Sector GSP PC 1:378 6:211 2:402 ¡3:774 ¡5:675¤
(0:951) (4:388) (2:710) (5:160) (3:232)
Wage Earners 0:436¤¤¤ ¡0:655 0:388 0:034 0:022
(0:138) (0:577) (0:439) (0:202) (0:220)
Contributions ¡0:010 0:127 ¡0:036 0:006 0:489¤¤¤
(0:041) (0:113) (0:124) (0:051) (0:100)
Union Members ¡0:038 ¡0:027 0:021 ¡0:032 ¡0:055 ¤ ¤
(0:028) (0:064) (0:116) (0:024) (0:023)
2000-2007
Cap ¡0:030 ¡0:582¤ 0:381 ¡0:537 ¡0:078
(0:227) (0:290) (0:775) (0:565) (0:426)
Sector GSP PC 1:813 ¤ ¤ 11:986¤¤¤ ¡1:374 ¡1:097 ¡8:445
(0:722) (2:291) (4:398) (4:066) (9:059)
Wage Earners 0:173¤¤¤ 0:157 0:452 0:104 0:294
(0:061) (0:542) (0:748) (0:109) (0:508)
Contributions 0:162 ¡0:101 ¡0:005 ¡0:057 0:458 ¤ ¤
(0:128) (0:087) (0:203) (0:117) (0:217)
Union Members ¡0:035¤ ¡0:005 ¡0:275 0:021 0:011
(0:018) (0:022) (0:258) (0:035) (0:037)
Table 17: Robustness Checks: Low Cap States. The dependent variable is the observed per capita
private-activity borrowing, for the indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all
regression tables appear in note 24. N=400 in the log models. N=200 in the reporting group
models. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial correlation.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Main Speci¯cation
Cap 0:039 0:014 0:130 ¡0:056 0:102¤
(0:032) (0:024) (0:121) (0:092) (0:051)
Cap*Report 0:071 0:000 0:310 ¤ ¤ 0:098 0:112
(0:044) (0:026) (0:125) (0:109) (0:091)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:849 22:756¤¤¤ 4:149 ¡0:816 5:822
(1:011) (2:526) (6:424) (5:652) (17:211)
Wage Earners 0:262 1:060 0:278 0:580 0:017
(0:163) (0:769) (1:129) (0:566) (0:365)
Contributions ¡0:078 ¡0:195¤¤¤ ¡0:051 0:197 1:238
(0:235) (0:067) (0:227) (0:222) (0:790)
Union Members ¡0:020 0:049 0:306 0:039 ¡0:026
(0:035) (0:042) (0:553) (0:071) (0:055)
F test - Cap Variables 2:08 0:42 20:23 0:42 3:58
p 0:148 0:663 0:000 0:661 0:044
F test - P&E Variables 0:89 32:48 0:43 0:45 1:01
p 0:484 0:000 0:783 0:768 0:421
State Fixed E®ects
Cap 0:039 0:015 0:127 ¡0:052 0:124 ¤ ¤
(0:031) (0:024) (0:120) (0:085) (0:053)
Cap*Report 0:068 ¡0:001 0:309 ¤ ¤ 0:089 0:100
(0:044) (0:026) (0:122) (0:097) (0:090)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:585 22:924¤¤¤ 3:617 ¡0:671 5:065
(0:995) (2:529) (6:022) (5:856) (18:056)
Wage Earners 0:272 1:057 0:185 0:650 ¡0:091
(0:166) (0:760) (0:984) (0:558) (0:422)
Contributions ¡0:082 ¡0:196¤¤¤ ¡0:115 0:149 1:038
(0:226) (0:067) (0:238) (0:212) (0:734)
Union Members ¡0:021 0:044 0:261 0:038 ¡0:027
(0:034) (0:042) (0:560) (0:076) (0:062)
Table 18: Regression Results: High Cap States. The dependent variable is the observed per capita
private-activity borrowing, for the indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all
regression tables appear in note 24. N=400. The ¯rst row of F tests evaluate the joint signi¯cance
of Cap and Cap¤Report. The second row of F tests evaluate the joint signi¯cance of the GSP, wage
earner, contributions and union member variables. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered
by state and corrected for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
60Industry Utilities Mortgage Multifamily Student
Logs
Cap ¡0:159 ¡0:818¤ ¡0:446 ¡0:753¤ 0:717
(0:273) (0:403) (0:600) (0:409) (0:453)
Cap*Report 0:302 0:348 1:344¤¤¤ 0:050 0:409
(0:303) (0:250) (0:477) (0:420) (0:403)
Sector GSP PC 0:403 2:217¤¤¤ 0:780 1:791¤ 1:800
(0:295) (0:518) (1:316) (0:981) (1:588)
Wage Earners 0:017 ¤ ¤ 0:010 0:020 0:014 ¡0:023
(0:007) (0:041) (0:039) (0:018) (0:026)
Contributions ¡0:011 ¡0:003 ¡0:009 0:007 0:047¤
(0:015) (0:005) (0:007) (0:009) (0:027)
Union Members 0:000 0:009¤ ¡0:008 ¡0:000 ¡0:003
(0:002) (0:004) (0:015) (0:004) (0:004)
1992-1999
Cap ¡0:009 0:036 0:147 0:018 0:157¤¤¤
(0:014) (0:027) (0:101) (0:079) (0:039)
Sector GSP PC ¡0:821 16:243¤¤¤ 0:405 6:718 ¡8:107
(1:104) (5:196) (3:952) (10:017) (14:391)
Wage Earners 0:304¤ ¡0:403 0:222 0:087 ¡0:953
(0:167) (0:673) (1:230) (0:610) (0:569)
Contributions ¡0:198 ¡0:248¤¤¤ ¡0:206 0:212 ¡0:003
(0:213) (0:071) (0:129) (0:277) (0:871)
Union Members 0:010 0:140 ¡0:059 0:051 ¡0:003
(0:046) (0:117) (0:116) (0:119) (0:092)
2000-2007
Cap 0:108 ¤ ¤ ¡0:026 0:386¤¤¤ 0:044 0:164 ¤ ¤
(0:048) (0:031) (0:080) (0:053) (0:078)
Sector GSP PC ¡1:140 26:176¤¤¤ 8:321 ¡7:818 3:944
(1:688) (3:923) (8:871) (9:284) (22:974)
Wage Earners 0:239 3:698 ¡1:933 1:017 2:261¤
(0:203) (2:364) (1:995) (1:093) (1:150)
Contributions ¡0:083 ¡0:204 ¤ ¤ ¡0:263 0:251 1:180
(0:258) (0:089) (0:619) (0:373) (1:920)
Union Members 0:008 0:093 0:687 0:088 ¡0:061
(0:064) (0:103) (0:883) (0:127) (0:103)
Table 19: Robustness Checks: High Cap States. The dependent variable is the observed per capita
private-activity borrowing, for the indicated purpose. Additional, extensive notes relevant to all
regression tables appear in note 24. N=400 in the log models. N=200 in the reporting group
models. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state and corrected for serial correlation.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
61Total Actual Predicted Di®erence
Mean Per Capita Borrowing 77.16 83.39 6.24
Mean Borrowing 292.3 309.1 16.9
Annual Total Borrowing 14,612.6 15,457.4 844.7
Industrial Actual Predicted Di®erence
Mean Per Capita Borrowing 9.16 9.85 0.68
Mean Borrowing 36.3 39.2 2.9
Annual Total Borrowing 1,816.5 1,960.3 143.8
Utilities Actual Predicted Di®erence
Mean Per Capita Borrowing 9.66 10.27 0.61
Mean Borrowing 43.7 44.2 0.5
Annual Total Borrowing 2,183.0 2,209.7 26.7
Mortgage Actual Predicted Di®erence
Mean Per Capita Borrowing 28.62 31.59 2.97
Mean Borrowing 93.1 100.3 7.3
Annual Total Borrowing 4,653.4 5,016.9 363.6
Multifamily Actual Predicted Di®erence
Mean Per Capita Borrowing 15.06 15.05 -0.01
Mean Borrowing 74.9 69.9 -5.0
Annual Total Borrowing 3,743.5 3,494.3 -249.1
Student Loans Actual Predicted Di®erence
Mean Per Capita Borrowing 13.31 15.36 2.05
Mean Borrowing 39.0 50.0 11.0
Annual Total Borrowing 1,949.3 2,499.9 550.6
Table 20: Private-Activity Borrowing with a 10% Increase in the Volume Cap. After running the
OLS models displayed in table 8, I replace the actual volume caps with 110% of their values, and
predicted borrowing with the full set of covariates. The means are across all state-year observations.
The annual national borrowing is the sum over all states and years with the predicted per capita
values multiplied by the population in the state-year. All ¯gures are in year 2000 dollars.
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